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Apostoledes v. State: MURDER RE-
TRIAL NOT BARRED BY 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHERE 
FIRST TRIAL RESULTED IN 
CONSPIRACY ACQUITTAL AND 
JURY DEADLOCK. 
In Apostoledes v. State, 593 A.2d 
1117 (Md. 1991), the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland allowed the retrial 
of a defendant charged with murder 
committed by a principal in the second 
degree, even though her previous trial 
had resulted in an acquittal as to the 
conspiracy charge and a jury deadlock 
as to the second degree murder charge. 
The defendant, Marie Apostoledes, 
asserted that her prior acquittal barred 
a retrial for reasons based upon estab-
lished double jeopardy grounds and 
the recent United States Supreme Court 
holding of Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. 
Ct. 2084 (1990). 
While at his home in 1988, Stephen 
Apostoledes received three gunshot 
wounds to the head that resulted in his 
death. The victim's wife, Ms. 
Apostoledes, and her son, John Lacey, 
were also present in the home at the 
time of the shooting. Following the 
shooting, both Ms. Apostoledes and 
her son were charged in connection 
with the murder. John Lacey pled 
guilty to second degree murder. The 
State brought a four count indictment 
against Ms. Apostoledes, charging 
her with: (1) first degree murder in-
cluding the lesser included offenses of 
second degree murder and manslaugh-
ter, (2) conspiracy to commit murder, 
(3) unlawful use of a handgun in the 
commission of a felony, and (4) acces-
sory after the fact to murder. 
At trial, the State presented evi-
dence that after the shooting, Ms. 
Apostoledes waited approximately one 
hour before calling 911, thereby al-
lowing her husband to bleed to death. 
The State also produced two key wit-
nesses, the first of whom testified that 
he heard pinging sounds shortly after 
leaving the house and the room in 
which both Ms. Apostoledes and the 
victim were located. The State's sec-
ond witness, Lacey's girlfriend, testi-
fied that she had confronted Ms. 
Apostoledes regarding her involve-
mentintheshooting. Ms. Apostoledes 
neither denied nor commented on the 
accusation. Lacey's girlfriend also 
testified that Ms. Apostoledes had 
stated that she did not love her hus-
band and wished he were dead. At the 
close of all evidence, the judge acquit-
ted Ms. Apostoledes on the charges of 
conspiracy and accessory after the 
fact. The jury could not reach a 
verdict on the two remaining counts of 
murder and unlawful handgun use. 
The court, therefore, granted a mis-
trial. 
The State subsequently moved to 
retry Ms. Apostoledes. Before the 
second trial, Ms. Apostoledes moved 
to dismiss the indictment for second 
degree murder arguing that a retrial 
would be violative of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
Apostoledes, 593 A.2d at 1120. The 
circuit court denied her motion to 
dismiss and stayed proceedings until 
review by the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland . After the court of 
special appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's decision, the court of appeals 
granted certiorari. 
In the course of her appeal, Ms. 
Apostoledes contended that a second 
trial was barred by three forms of 
double jeopardy: former jeopardy/ 
acquittal, collateral estoppel, and the 
" same conduct" test derived from the 
recent United States Supreme Court 
decision of Grady v. Corbin. 
Apostoledes, 593 A.2d at 1120, 1123. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by first examining Ms. 
Apostoledes's argument that former 
jeopardy/acquittal barred retrial. The 
court agreed that under former jeop-
ardy/acquittal, Ms. Apostoledes could 
not be retried if the two charges were 
found to be the same offense. How-
ever, the court determined that con-
spiracy and murder by a principal in 
the second degree were not the same 
offenses. The court stated, " [t]he gist 
of a conspiracy is an agreement be-
tween two persons to commit a crime. " 
[d. at 1120. 
The court emphasized that for the 
crime of murder committed by a prin-
cipal in the second degree, there need 
not be proof of an agreement as in the 
case of a conspiracy. Rather, the court 
held that there must be proof that the 
defendant "was present and aided, 
counseled, commanded, or encour-
aged the commission of the murder. " 
[d. Because Ms. Apostoledes could 
have aided Lacey in the murder with-
out any agreement, the court con-
cluded that" neither an acquittal nor a 
conviction of a conspiracy is a bar to 
a prosecution for the commission of 
that crime or for aiding or abetting 
another to commit it." [d. at 1121 
(quoting Gi/pin v. State, 121 A. 354, 
356 (Md. 1923». 
The court further found that the 
retrial was not barred for collateral 
estoppel reasons resulting from 
Apostoledes's acquittal on the con-
spiracy charge. For collateral estop-
pel to apply, the court reasoned that 
the two criminal charges must have 
had a common, necessary factual com-
ponent. 593 A.2d at 1121 (relying on 
Ashv. Swenson, 397U.S. 436(1970». 
The court noted that collateral estop-
pel focuses on what the factfinder did 
find or must have found. 593 A.2d at 
1121 (citing Ferrellv. State, 567 A.2d 
937, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3301 
(1990». 
The court reviewed the comments 
of the trial judge who emphasized that 
an individual can be acquitted for 
conspiracy but still found guilty of 
murder in the second degree by aiding 
and abetting. The court agreed that 
the acquittal on the conspiracy count 
was not based on the State's failure to 
prove a fact that was an essential 
element of murder and thus, collateral 
estoppel did not apply. 593 A.2d at 
1122. 
The court of appeals also reviewed 
the most recent double jeopardy de-
fense by interpreting Grady v. Corbin. 
593 A.2d at 1123-24. Under the 
"same conduct" test in Grady, 
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Apostoledes argued that the State would 
be precluded from a retrial because to 
do so would force the State to prove 
conduct for which she was previously 
tried. [d. at 1123. However, the court 
of appeals stated, " [n]owhere in its 
opinion did the Grady Court suggest 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
tects against multiple trials when one 
or more counts are left unresolved 
following an initial trial due to jury 
deadlock, the grant of a new trial, or 
reversal on appeal." [d. at 1123. The 
court asserted, rather, that the holding 
in Grady applied to cases in which the 
State failed to bring and join for trial 
all charges arising from a single epi-
sode in a single proceeding. By ini-
tially bringing all criminal charges 
against Ms. Apostoledes in a single 
proceeding, the State conformed ex-
actly to Grady's new double jeopardy 
" same conduct" test, thereby avoid-
ing the double jeopardy problems at 
issue in Grady. [d. 
Judge McAuliffe concurred in the 
ruling with the exception of the 
majority's interpretation of double 
jeopardy in Grady. He opined that the 
Supreme Court did not limit Grady to 
successive prosecutions only, but may 
have intended it to apply to multiple 
punishments as well. Finding the 
Blockberger "same offense" test a 
rather sterile approach, McAuliffe 
stated, "[t]he Grady modification 
utilizes a case-oriented approach, add-
ing flesh to the bare bones of each 
essential element the conduct used to 
prove that element, and then compar-
ing the list of elements so defined." 
[d. at 1124 (citing Blockberger v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)). 
He concluded, though, that even if 
Grady did apply to multiple punish-
ments, the result in this case would not 
have changed because conspiracy and 
murder are not the same offense. 593 
A.2d at 1126. 
In its review of double jeopardy 
challenges, the court ruled that former 
jeopardy /acquittal, collateral estoppel, 
and the recent Grady" same conduct" 
test did not preclude the State from 
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retrying the case for second degree 
murder despite a prior conspiracy ac-
quittal. This decision is significant as 
it gives the State the opportunity for a 
retrial in cases of acquittal or jury 
deadlock and provides insight into 
how Grady should be interpreted. 
- Karl Phillips 
Chisom v. Roemer: JUDICIAL 
ELECTIONS COVERED WITIllN 
MEANING OF "REPRESENTA-
TIVES" IN VOTERS' RIGHTS 
ACT. 
The Supreme Court of the United 
States settled a statutory interpretation 
conflict among federal courts of ap-
peals in deciding Chisom v. Roemer, 
111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991). In Chisom, 
the Supreme Court held that the use of 
the term" representatives" in the Vot-
ers' Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 
1982, covers judicial elections as well 
as legislative elections. This holding 
overturned the interpretation of Sec-
tion 2 by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
The petitioners in Chisom repre-
sented a class of approximately 135,000 
African-American registered voters in 
Orleans Parish, Louisiana. The peti-
tioners brought their suit against vari-
ous state elected officials challenging 
the electoral process of judges to the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana. 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
consists of seven members. Two are 
elected from one multi-member su-
preme court district. The remaining 
five members are elected in single-
member supreme court districts. The 
one multi-member district consists of 
four parishes, one of which is the 
Orleans Parish. In the Orleans Parish 
more than one-half of the registered 
voters are African-American, whereas 
three-fourths of the registered voters 
in the other three parishes are white. 
The petitioners alleged that the 
Louisiana method of electing judges 
impermissibly diluted the voting 
strength of African-Americans in vio-
lationofSection2 of the Voters Rights 
Act of 1965 by broadening the popu-
lace of voters, thus frustrating efforts 
by African-Americans to elect an Af-
rican-American judge. [d. The United 
States District Court for the District of 
Louisiana dismissed the petitioners' 
claim holding that judges are not" rep-
resentatives," and thus judicial elec-
tions are not covered under Section 2 
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d. at 2359. 
On appeal, the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded the case find-
ing that the term "representatives" 
within the Voters' Rights Act included 
anyone elected by a popular election 
from a field of candidates. The court 
thus held that judges were included 
within the meaning of " representa-
tives." [d. On remand the district 
court concluded that insufficient evi-
dence existed to establish a violation 
of Section 2 of the Voters' Rights Act 
and the petitioners appealed once again 
to the court of appeals. [d. at 2360. 
Following the en banc decision in a 
similar case, the court of appeals re-
manded Chisom, and the petitioners 
appealed. [d. at 2361. 
While the petitioners' appeal was 
pending, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit decided League o/United 
Latin-American Citizens Council v. 
Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (1990) (here-
inafter "LULAC"), a case similar to 
Chisom involving the interpretation 
of "representative" within Section 2 
of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965. 
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. 2360. TheLULAC 
court reasoned that, because public 
opinion is irrelevant in the role of the 
judiciary, judges do not serve in a 
representative capacity and are not 
included within the meaning of " rep-
resentative" in interpreting Section 2 
of the Voters' Rights Act. [d. 
The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari arid consolidated LULA C and 
Chisom for determining the test to be 
applied in deciding whether a viola-
tion of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965 
exists in judicial and other elections. 
[d. at 2362. 
The Court began its analysis by 
setting out the text of Section 2 of the 
